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Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Inc. (AVCV) is
an Arizona nonprofit corporation that works to promote and protect crime victims’ interests throughout
the criminal justice process. To achieve these goals,
AVCV empowers victims of crime through legal advocacy and social services. AVCV also provides continuing legal education to the judiciary, lawyers, and
law enforcement.
AVCV seeks to foster a fair justice system that
(1) provides crime victims with resources and information to help them seek immediate crisis intervention; (2) informs crime victims of their rights under
the laws of the United States and Arizona; (3) ensures that crime victims fully understand those
rights; and (4) promotes meaningful ways for crime
victims to enforce their rights, including through direct legal representation.
Memory of Victims Everywhere to Rescue Justice
(MOVE) was founded in California in 1988 by Gary
and Collene Campbell to fight for justice and rights
for all crime victims. The Campbells’ son, Scott, was
brutally murdered at the age of 27 when he was
lured onto a Cessna airplane by a high school friend,
flown out to sea, beaten, and thrown overboard in an
apparent robbery attempt.
Since its founding,
MOVE has been a national leader in calling for the
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enactment of constitutional rights for crime victims
and for the vigorous enforcement of criminal laws to
keep our communities and people safe.
The National Crime Victim Law Institute
(NCVLI) is a nonprofit educational organization located at Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland, Oregon. NCVLI’s mission is to actively promote balance
and fairness in the justice system through crime victim-centered legal advocacy, education, and resource
sharing. NCVLI accomplishes its mission through
education and training; technical assistance to attorneys; promotion of the National Alliance of Victims’
Rights Attorneys; research and analysis of developments in crime victim law; and provision of information on crime victim law to crime victims and other members of the public. In addition, NCVLI
actively participates as amicus curiae in cases across
the Nation that involve crime victims’ rights.
Amici have a keen interest in ensuring that courts
have the benefit of information and policy insights as
they perform the difficult task of safeguarding the
rights of the accused while also vindicating the rights
of crime victims—not to mention protecting the wider
community.
Measures like the one at issue in this case further those goals by protecting victims’ rights, bringing offenders to justice, and safeguarding communities. They do not offend due process because the
high risk that a sex offender will reoffend, combined
with the devastating harm to victims and communities and the high risk of flight, justifies the determination that—certainly where the proof is evident or
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presumption great—defendants charged with sexual
assault are categorically ineligible for bail.
Amici are concerned that if permitted to stand,
the decision below will deprive the States of a muchneeded tool for keeping sexual assault victims and
communities safe. Nothing in the Constitution requires—much less permits—that unfortunate result.
Amici respectfully request that the Court grant their
motion, grant the petition, and reverse the judgment
below.
Respectfully submitted.
STEVEN J. TWIST
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Scottsdale, Arizona 85267
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BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE*
Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Inc. (AVCV) is
an Arizona nonprofit corporation that works to promote and protect crime victims’ interests throughout
the criminal justice process. To achieve these goals,
AVCV empowers victims of crime through legal advocacy and social services. AVCV also provides continuing legal education to the judiciary, lawyers, and
law enforcement.
AVCV seeks to foster a fair justice system that
(1) provides crime victims with resources and information to help them seek immediate crisis intervention; (2) informs crime victims of their rights under
the laws of the United States and Arizona; (3) ensures that crime victims fully understand those
rights; and (4) promotes meaningful ways for crime
victims to enforce their rights, including through direct legal representation.
Memory of Victims Everywhere to Rescue Justice
(MOVE) was founded in California in 1988 by Gary
and Collene Campbell to fight for justice and rights
for all crime victims. The Campbells’ son, Scott, was
* Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici represent that
this brief was not authored in whole or in part by any party or
counsel for any party. No person or party other than amici,
their members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution
to the preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel of record
for all parties received notice of the filing of this brief in compliance with Supreme Court Rule 37.2. Petitioner consented to
the filing of this brief, but Respondent withheld consent.
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brutally murdered at the age of 27 when he was
lured onto a Cessna airplane by a high school friend,
flown out to sea, beaten, and thrown overboard.
Since its founding, MOVE has been a national leader
in calling for the enactment of constitutional rights
for crime victims and for the vigorous enforcement of
criminal laws to keep our communities and people
safe.
The National Crime Victim Law Institute
(NCVLI) is a nonprofit educational organization located at Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland, Oregon. NCVLI’s mission is to actively promote balance
and fairness in the justice system through crime victim–centered legal advocacy, education, and resource
sharing. NCVLI accomplishes its mission through
education and training; technical assistance to attorneys; promotion of the National Alliance of Victims’
Rights Attorneys; research and analysis of developments in crime victim law; and provision of information on crime victim law to crime victims and other members of the public. In addition, NCVLI
actively participates as amicus curiae in cases across
the Nation that involve crime victims’ rights.
Amici have a keen interest in ensuring that courts
have the information and policy insights needed to
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused
while vindicating the rights of crime victims—not to
mention protecting the wider community. Nothing in
the Constitution prohibits the States from empowering courts to protect crime victims by denying bail
when—as determined by a court after a full and fair
adversarial process—the proof is evident that a defendant committed a sexually violent offense. This
Court’s intervention is sorely needed to ensure that
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when, as here, States act well within the Constitution
to protect crime victims and keep communities safe,
courts are not permitted to improperly thwart those
efforts.
STATEMENT
1. In 2002, over 80 percent of Arizona voters
approved Proposition 103, which amended Arizona’s
constitution by rendering a defendant categorically
ineligible for bail if “the proof is evident or the presumption great” that he committed sexual assault.
Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22(A)(1); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 133961(A)(2).
Sexual assault under Arizona law is rape: “intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person without consent.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1406(A).1
Arizonans approved Proposition 103 “both to ensure that sexual predators facing potential life sentences would be present for trial and to keep ‘rapists
and child molesters’ from endangering others while
awaiting trial.” Pet. App. 9. As one legislator explained, “‘sexual predators * * * know they could be
facing lifetime incarceration’ and therefore ‘ha[ve] no
incentive to ever return’ to court, making Proposition
1

See Nat’l Inst. of Just., Rape and Sexual Violence (DOJ
2017), https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/rape-sexual-violence/Pages/
welcome.aspx (“Most statutes currently define rape as nonconsensual oral, anal, or vaginal penetration of the victim by body
parts or objects”); Office of Pub. Affairs, An Updated Definition
of Rape (DOJ 2012), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/
updated-definition-rape (defining rape as “penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim”).
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103 necessary to ‘keep dangerous sexual predators
off our streets.’” Pet. App. 9 (alterations in original).
Proposition 103 was adopted “to ‘prevent the worst
sexual predators from jumping bail or even simply
walking our neighborhoods,’ stopping ‘rapists and
child molesters’ from reoffending, and treating ‘bail
for rapists and child molesters * * * like bail for
murderers.’” Pet. App. 9–10 (alterations in original).
By denying bail when—as determined by a court
after an adversarial proceeding—the proof is evident
that a defendant committed a sexually violent offense, Proposition 103 helps ensure that victims of
sexual assault receive the full panoply of protections
they are guaranteed by the Arizona constitution—
including the right to be “treated with fairness, respect, and dignity” and to be “free from intimidation,
harassment, or abuse, throughout the criminal justice process.” Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1(A)(1).2
2. Respondent Guy James Goodman—after being confronted with DNA evidence—pleaded guilty to
sexual assault for creeping into his victim’s bedroom,
crawling into bed with her, pulling down her underwear, and penetrating her with his fingers. Pet.
App. 5–6, 88.
2 Arizona is by no means unique in guaranteeing crime victims certain constitutionally protected rights. See, e.g., Cal.
Const. art. I, § 28(b)(1) (“a victim shall * * * be free from intimidation, harassment, and abuse, throughout the criminal or juvenile justice process”); Or. Const. art. I, § 43(1)(a) (granting
victims the “right to be reasonably protected from the criminal
defendant or the convicted criminal throughout the criminal
justice process”). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1), (a)(8) (guaranteeing victims right “to be reasonably protected from the accused”
and “to be treated with fairness and with respect”).
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Just before his arrest, the Arizona Supreme
Court held that Proposition 103 could not be constitutionally applied to defendants charged with sexual
conduct with a minor. Simpson v. Miller, 387 P.3d
1270 (Ariz. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Arizona v.
Martinez, 138 S. Ct. 146 (2017). The court held that
criminal sexual conduct with a minor was not a sufficient proxy for future dangerousness because, in addition to criminalizing the defendant’s conduct—
molesting children under fifteen when he was in his
twenties and thirties—the statute also arguably
criminalized consensual sex between teenagers. Id.
at 1278.
Relying on Simpson, the trial court in the instant
case ruled that Goodman was entitled to bond. Even
though the proof was evident that Goodman sexually
assaulted the victim, the court concluded that the
State failed to prove he presented “a substantial
danger to other persons or the community.” Pet.
App. 84.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that
“[s]exual assault remains a non-bailable offense.”
Pet. App. 76. Unlike sexual conduct with a minor,
which encompasses statutory rape, “the nonconsensual nature of [sexual assault] fulfills the requirement for finding inherent dangerousness.” Pet.
App. 81.
3. In a sharply divided 4-3 decision, the Arizona
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that data regarding
sex offenders’ high “post-conviction recidivism rates
do not inherently demonstrate that a person charged
with sexual assault will likely commit another sexual
assault if released pending trial.” Pet. App. 16 (em-
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phasis added); see also Pet. App. 13 (requiring proof
“that most persons charged with sexual assault, or
even a significant number, would likely commit another sexual assault or otherwise dangerous crime
pending trial if released on bail”). The court brushed
aside the risk that someone potentially facing life
imprisonment, involuntary commitment, and lifetime
registration as a sex offender inherently poses a
flight risk because not all offenders will face such
dire consequences. Pet. App. 11.
4. Justice Clint Bolick—author of the Simpson
majority opinion—dissented, joined by two other justices. His dissent emphasized that “sexual assault is
by definition a uniquely horrific act, in which a person’s most intimate parts are violated through force,
coercion, or deception.” Pet. App. 24. He would have
held that Proposition 103 withstands scrutiny because this Court has made clear that “a state may
categorically regulate sex offenders as a class for
public safety purposes, both because of the uniquely
horrific nature of the crimes and sex offenders’ propensity for recidivism.” Pet. App. 26–27 (citing
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)). Justice Bolick
concluded by “urg[ing]” this Court to intervene. Pet.
App. 30–31.
Justice Gould, joined by Justice Lopez, authored
a separate dissent. He criticized the majority for departing from this Court’s decision in United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), concerning the proper
standard for facial constitutional challenges, and for
imposing “an impossible standard” on the State. Pet.
App. 31–32.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As this Court recognized in Smith v. Doe, releasing sex offenders pending trial presents a substantial
danger to the community because the “risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is ‘frightening and
high.’” 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (“high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders” means they
pose risk of future “dangerousness as a class”).
When “sex offenders reenter society, they are much
more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.” McKune
v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002) (plurality) (“Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation.”); see also
United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 395–96
(2013) (“recidivism rates among sex offenders are
higher than the average for other types of criminals”).
The damage inflicted when sex offenders reoffend
is drastic and severe—for both victims and their
communities. “Sexual assault is by definition an extremely dangerous crime.” Pet. App. 23 (Bolick, J.,
dissenting). As this Court has explained, sexual assault “is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense
and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy” of the victim—“[s]hort of homicide, it is the ‘ultimate violation of self.’” Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597–98 (1977); see also Pet.
App. 11 (majority) (“sexual assault is a deplorable
crime that endangers and dehumanizes victims”).
Because the punishment should fit the crime, the
consequences of a sexual assault conviction are (or at
least strive to be) as drastic and severe as the harm
inflicted on victims and communities. Convicted sex
offenders face not only potentially lengthy prison
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sentences, but also the possibility of indefinite involuntary commitment after completing that sentence.
E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1406(B)–(D) (providing
sentencing range of five years to life, with no possibility of parole); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-3701 et seq. (involuntary commitment).
Even after their release from state custody, sex
offenders face serious collateral consequences of their
conviction—in particular, having to register as a
convicted sex offender and comply with the attendant regulatory schemes. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-3821 et seq.
As several members of this Court have noted,
registering as a sex offender entails numerous, lifelong social, economic, and psychological consequences. See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 99 (describing “the
attendant humiliation” and “public shame” that are
“collateral consequence[s]” of registration); id. at 109
& n.* (Souter, J., concurring) (describing “the severity of the burdens imposed * * * such as exclusion
from jobs or housing, harassment, and physical
harm”); id. at 112 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is also
clear beyond peradventure that these unique [registration and reporting] consequences of conviction of a
sex offense are punitive.”); id. at 115–16 (Ginsburg,
J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting) (registration “resemble[s] historically common forms of punishment”
and is “punitive in effect”).
As a result of these exceedingly serious consequences, releasing sex offenders pending trial presents a substantial danger to the community not only
because the “risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders
is ‘frightening and high,’” Smith, 538 U.S. at 103
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(majority), but also because the risk of sex offenders
fleeing justice is equally high. To address these serious public policy and criminal justice concerns,
States across the Nation have taken steps to ensure
that sex offenders are brought to justice, victims are
protected, and communities are safeguarded.
At issue in this case is one such measure—
denying bail in sexual assault cases once a court is
satisfied, after a full adversarial hearing, that the
“proof” of sexual assault “is evident or the presumption great.” Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22(A)(1); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 13-3961(A)(2).
As the State has ably demonstrated in its petition (at 11–16), the conclusion of the court below that
this measured, common-sense approach violates due
process cannot be reconciled with this Court’s cases,
which have made clear that the Constitution does
not prohibit denying bail to defendants who present
(1) “a continuing danger to the community” or (2) “a
risk of flight.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 749 (1987). Nor does the Constitution prohibit
categorically denying bail based on the nature of the
charged offense. Id. at 753–54. Indeed, thirty-four
states categorically deny bail to persons charged
with capital offenses, murder, specified sex offenses,
or offenses punishable by life imprisonment.3 Re3 Ala. Const. art. I, § 16; Alaska Const. art I, § 11; Ariz.
Const. art. II, § 22; Ark. Const. art. II, § 8; Colo. Const. art. II,
§ 19; Conn. Const. art. I, § 8; Del. Const. art. I, § 12; Idaho
Const. art. I, § 6; Ill. Const. art. I, § 9; Ind. Const. art. I, § 17;
Iowa Const. art. I, § 12; Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 9; Ky.
Const. § 16; La. Const. art. I, § 18; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276,
§ 20D; Me. Const. art. I, § 10; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7; Miss.
Const. art. III, § 29; Mo. Const. art. I, § 20; Mont. Const. art. II,
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view is needed to resolve the conflict the decision below creates with this Court’s precedent on an exceedingly important issue of constitutional law that affects the criminal justice system, crime victims, and
community safety in States across the Nation.
This Court’s review is especially needed because
of the exceedingly serious implications for victims
and their communities if the judgment below is permitted to stand. Given sex offenders’ frighteningly
high recidivism rates, and the life-altering harm suffered by their victims, Arizona’s legislature was entirely reasonable when it opted to categorically deny
bail to sexual-assault defendants on the ground that
sexual assault is an adequate proxy for future dangerousness—and to build in procedural protections
that go above and beyond in ensuring due process.
The Constitution does not prohibit States like Arizona and others from taking these steps to ensure sex
offenders are brought to justice, victims are protected, and communities are safeguarded.

§ 21; N.D. Const. art. I, § 11; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 597:1-c; N.M.
Const. art. II, § 13; Neb. Const. art. I, § 9; Nev. Const. art. I, § 7;
Ohio Const. art. I, § 9; Or. Const. art. I, § 14; Pa. Const. art. I,
§ 14; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 8; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15; Tex.
Const. art. I, § 11; Utah Const. art. I, § 8; Wash. Const. art. I,
§ 20; Wyo. Const. art. I, § 14.
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ARGUMENT
I.

SEXUAL ASSAULT IS A SUFFICIENT PROXY
FOR FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS.

It is well established that government has a “legitimate and compelling * * * interest in preventing
crime by arrestees.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749. Accordingly, a State can categorically deny bail based
on the charged offense if it can show that defendants
charged with that offense categorically present “a
continuing danger to the community.” Ibid. Arizona
has made its task even easier by limiting the denial
of bail to those cases in which a court finds the “proof
is evident or the presumption great” that the defendant committed the charged offense.
As over 80 percent of Arizona’s electorate recognized in approving Proposition 103, sexual assault is
precisely such a crime. Sex offenders have such a
“high rate of recidivism” that they present a “substantial risk” of future “dangerousness as a class.”
Smith, 538 U.S. at 103. And the magnitude of the
harm inflicted by these particularly heinous crimes
further compels the conclusion that sex offenders
categorically present a danger to the community—a
danger that justifies their incapacitation pending
trial, at least where the proof of their guilt is evident.
A. Sex Offenders Reoffend At Alarmingly
High Rates.
A substantial body of academic literature, supported by data collected by the U.S. Department of
Justice, confirms that sex offenders reoffend at extremely high rates—regardless of how reoffending is
defined (convictions versus arrests), and regardless
of subsequent offense—be it another sex crime, a dif-
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ferent violent crime, or any other type of subsequent
crime.
Studies have found that 17 percent of sex offenders were convicted of another sex offense within five
years of release—with 21 percent reconvicted within
ten years. See, e.g., Andrew J.R. Harris & R. Karl
Hanson, Sex Offender Recidivism: A Simple Question
2004–03 7 (Pub. Safety & Emergency Preparedness
Can. 2004), https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/
pblctns/sx-ffndr-rcdvsm/sx-ffndr-rcdvsm-eng.pdf (observing that offenders with prior sex-crime convictions were twice as likely to recidivate); see also Roger Przybylski, Adult Sex Offender Recidivism, in Sex
Offender Mgmt. Assessment & Planning Initiative
107, 111–15, 121 (DOJ 2017), https://smart.gov/SOMAPI/
pdfs/SOMAPI_Full%20Report.pdf (“The observed sexual recidivism rates of sex offenders range from
about 5 percent after three years to about 24 percent
after 15 years.”).
The recidivism rates are even higher for subsequent arrests of sex offenders for any type of crime—
an important statistic because “policies aimed at
public protection should also be concerned with the
likelihood of any form of serious recidivism, not just
sexual recidivism.” R. Karl Hanson & Kelly MortonBourgon, Predictors of Sexual Recidivism: An Updated Meta-Analysis 2004–02 4 (Pub. Safety &
Emergency Preparedness Can. 2004), https://www.
publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2004-02-prdctrs-sxl
-rcdvsm-pdtd/2004-02-prdctrs-sxl-rcdvsm-pdtd-eng.pdf.4
4

In addition, studies show “that some crimes legally labeled
as nonsexual in the criminal histories of sex offenders may indeed be sexual in their underlying behavior.” Przybylski, Adult
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For example, an analysis of 400,000 state prisoners found that 21 percent of sex offenders were rearrested for a crime within six months of release, 31
percent were rearrested within one year, 44 percent
within two years, 51 percent within three years, and
60 percent within five years. Matthew R. Durose et
al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in
2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010 8 (DOJ 2014),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf;
see also Patrick A. Langan et al., Recidivism of Sex
Offenders Released from Prison in 1994 2, 13 (DOJ
2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf
(24 percent of sex offenders reconvicted of new offense within three years). Those rates are 10 percent
higher than the rate at which murderers were rearrested over the same period. Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners at 8.
Indeed, one study shows that over a five-year period, 21.4 percent of sex offenders were rearrested for
violent offenses—nearly identical to the 21.7 percent
of homicide convicts who were rearrested for violent
offenses during that same period. See Matthew R.
Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30
States in 2005:
Patterns from 2005 to 2010—
Supplemental Tables 2 (DOJ 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510_st.pdf; see also Langan
et al., Recidivism of Sex Offenders at 34 (17 percent
of sex offenders rearrested for violent offenses within
three years of release).

Sex Offender Recidivism at 108 (although murder and kidnapping are not inherently sexual, “when perpetrated by sex offenders, [they are] usually sexually motivated”).
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Further giving credence to Arizonans’ concern
about sexual-assault defendants “endangering others
while awaiting trial,” Pet. App. 9, a Department of
Justice study found that a significant number of sex
offenders—14 percent—not only reoffend, but also do
so while out on bail. Brian A. Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009—Statistical
Tables 15, 17, 20–21 (DOJ 2013), https://www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf (52 percent of sexualassault defendants were released pending trial).5 By
comparison, none of the murder defendants who
were released pending trial were rearrested. Ibid.
(noting that 18 percent of murder defendants were
released pending trial); see also Thomas H. Cohen &
Tracey Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2006 9 (DOJ 2010), https://www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf (reporting similar
statistics three years earlier—9 percent of released
rapists were rearrested before trial; no released
murderer was).6 And it is well established that
5 This study defines rape consistent with Arizona’s definition
of sexual assault. Compare id. at 34, with Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§§ 13-1406(A), -1401(A)(4).
6

Even these already high recidivism rates “are underestimates of the true reoffense rates” for at least two reasons.
Przybylski, Adult Sex Offender Recidivism at 108–09. First, no
study purports to identify every time a sex offender reoffends,
which would be all but impossible. Instead, studies rely on officially recorded metrics, like subsequent arrests. Ibid. (“Because
these official statistics reflect only offenses that come to the attention of authorities, they are a diluted measure of reoffending.”). Second, sex crimes themselves are significantly underreported, with studies finding that fewer than one-third of
victims contact the police. See ibid.; Rachel E. Morgan & Grace
Kena, Criminal Victimization, 2016 7 (DOJ 2017), https://www
.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv16.pdf (23 percent of rapes and sexu-
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States can categorically deny bail to murder defendants. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 753; Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S.524, 545–46 (1952).
Given the breadth of academic literature and
Department of Justice studies further demonstrating
“that recidivism rates among sex offenders are higher than the average for other types of criminals,” Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. at 395–96 (citing studies), it is
hardly surprising that this Court has repeatedly recognized that releasing sex offenders into the community is a perilous gamble. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 103
(noting the “dangerousness” of sex offenders “as a
class” due to their “frightening and high” recidivism
rates). Indeed, when “convicted sex offenders reenter
society, they are much more likely than any other
type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or
sexual assault.” McKune, 536 U.S. at 33.
B. The Harm Threatened By Sex-Offender
Recidivism Is Particularly Heinous
And Damaging To Victims And Communities.
Sexual assault “is a deplorable crime that endangers and dehumanizes victims.” Pet. App. 11. “Short
of homicide, it is the ‘ultimate violation of self.’”
Coker, 433 U.S. at 597. The Arizona electorate did
not run afoul of due process by deciding that to allow
a sexual-assault defendant—whose proof of guilt is
evident, as established by a court after an adversarial proceeding—to remain free pending trial presents
al assaults reported to police); see also Michael Planty et al.,
Female Victims of Sexual Violence, 1994–2010 6 (DOJ 2013),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf (slightly more
than one-third of rapes and sexual assaults reported).
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a substantial risk of imposing further harm on both
the victim and the community as a whole.
The harm inflicted by sex offenders extends well
beyond the over 320,000 annual victims of sexual assault.
Because sexual assault “undermines the
community’s sense of security, there is public injury
as well.” Id. at 598. In short, “sexual violence tears
at the fabric of community well-being.” Nat’l Sexual
Violence Res. Ctr., Impact of Sexual Violence: Fact
Sheet 2 (2010), http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/
files/NSVRC_Publicication_Factsheet_Impact-of-sexual
-violence.pdf.
In recognition of the catastrophic harms they
cause, this Court has stated—in no uncertain
terms—that “[s]ex offenders are a serious threat in
this Nation.” Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538
U.S. 1, 3 (2003) (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 32).
When “sex offenders reenter society, they are much
more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1739 (2017)
(quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 33). Indeed, sex offenders’ “deliberate viciousness * * * may be greater
than that of the murderer”—especially when one
considers the victims who are left “so grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is beyond
repair.” Coker, 433 U.S. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Given sex offenders’ alarmingly high recidivism
rates—and the profound harm suffered by victims
and communities—Arizona’s electorate acted well
within the bounds of due process when it opted to
categorically deny bail to sexual-assault defendants

17
on the ground that sexual assault is an adequate
proxy for future dangerousness (after judicial proceedings to determine that the proof of assault is evident). Further, by keeping dangerous criminals incapacitated pending trial, Proposition 103 also
vindicates the state-constitutionally protected rights
of victims to be free from intimidation, harassment,
and abuse while the criminal trial proceeds. And because Proposition 103 only applies if a court—after a
full adversarial hearing—finds that the proof of the
defendant’s guilt is evident, it goes above and beyond
the demands of due process.
II. DEFENDANTS FACING SEXUAL ASSAULT
CHARGES PRESENT SERIOUS FLIGHT RISKS.
In addition to presenting a danger to the community, “an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial
if he presents a risk of flight.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at
749 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979)).
As a matter of common sense and human nature, the
more severe the potential punishment, the higher
the risk that a defendant will flee rather than face
trial. Sexual-assault convictions certainly raise the
specter of severe punishments—especially considering not only the possibility of a lengthy prison sentence, but also the serious collateral consequences,
including involuntary commitment and sex-offender
registration.
The punishment for sexual assault in Arizona, as
in many States, “ranges from 5.25 years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment.” Pet. App. 11. See Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 13-1406(B) (no “suspension of sentence,
probation, pardon or release from confinement * * *
until the sentence imposed by the court has been
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served”); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1406(D) (“if
the sexual assault involved the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury, the person
may be sentenced to life imprisonment”).7
In addition to lengthy prison sentences, sexual
assault convictions are accompanied by severe collateral consequences—involuntary civil commitment
and sex-offender registration—each of which is sufficient to justify categorically denying bail based on
flight risk.
First, a sex offender’s confinement does not necessarily conclude at the end of a lengthy prison sentence: “[A]t the completion of a prison sentence a defendant faces potential commitment to the Arizona
State Hospital as a sexually violent person for an indefinite period of time.” Simpson v. Miller, 377 P.3d
1003, 1012 n.14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (Gould, J., dissenting) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-3701 et seq.).8
7 Other states impose similar penalties for similar sex offenses. E.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.55.125(i)(1) (presumptive twenty-tothirty years’ imprisonment, ninety-nine-year maximum); Mont.
Code § 45-5-503(1)–(2) (up to life); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28319(1)(a), -105(1) (up to fifty years); Tenn. Stat. §§ 39-13502(a)(2), -503(a)(2), 40-35-111(b)(1)–(2) (eight-to-sixty years);
Utah Code § 76-5-402 (five years to life); Vt. Stat. tit. 13, § 3252
(three years to life); Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225(1)–(2), 939.50(3)(b)–
(c) (up to sixty years).
8 Arizona is by no means an outlier in this respect. Nineteen
other states—along with the federal government—also subject
convicted sex offenders to potential involuntary commitment
after they have served their sentences. See Jeslyn A. Miller,
Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98
Cal. L. Rev. 2093, 2128 nn.21–22 (2010) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§§ 36-3701 to -3717; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6600–09.3; Fla.
Stat. §§ 394.910–394.932; 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/1.01 to /12;
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On several occasions, this Court has upheld state
laws that permit the involuntary civil commitment of
sex offenders—even after they have served their
criminal sentence. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997) (“an individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil context”);
Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001). Indeed, “the
practical effect of [involuntary commitment statutes]
may be to impose confinement for life.” Hendricks,
521 U.S. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Second, “[e]very U.S. state, the District of Columbia, the five principal U.S. territories, and over
125 federally recognized Indian tribes” require sex
offenders to register as such. Office of Sex Offender
Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering,
and Tracking (SMART), Sex Offender Registration
and Notification in the United States: Current Case
Law and Issues 1 (DOJ 2018), https://smart.gov/
caselaw/Case-Law-Update-2018-Compiled.pdf (“Congress has enacted various measures setting ‘miniIowa Code § 229A.1 et seq.; Kan. Stat. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a22;
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, §§ 1–16; Minn. Stat. § 253B.01 et
seq.; Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480–632.513; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 711201 to -1226; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 135-E et seq.; N.J. Stat. §§ 30:427.26 to -27.38; N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.01 et seq.; N.D.
Cent. Code §§ 25-03.3-01 to -44; 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 6401–09; S.C.
Code §§ 44-48-10 to -170; Tex. Health & Safety Code
§§ 841.001–841.007; Va. Code §§ 37.2-900 to -921; Wash. Rev.
Code §§ 71.09.010–71.09.903; Wis. Stat. §§ 980.01–980.14; 18
U.S.C. § 4248); see also Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Expert Testimony in Sexually Violent Predator Commitments: Conceptualizing Legal Standards of “Mental Disorder” and “Likely To
Reoffend,” 31 J. Am. Acad. Psych. & L. 471, 472, 484 (2003) (citing statutes).
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mum standards’ for jurisdictions to implement in
their sex offender registration or notifications systems.”).
Taking Arizona as an example, convicted sex offenders have ten days to register. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-3821(A)–(B). States use this registration to
“maintain an internet sex offender website,” which
includes offenders’ names, pictures, addresses, and
offenses of conviction. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3827(A)–
(B). In addition, if a sex offender moves, he must notify authorities of his new address “in person and in
writing” within seventy-two hours of the move. Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 13-3822(A). Authorities then have 45
days to “notify the community of the offender’s presence in the community.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 133825(D). That notification “must be disseminated in
a nonelectronic format to the surrounding neighborhood, area schools, appropriate community groups
and prospective employers”—and a “press release
* * * must be given to the local electronic and print
media to enable information to be placed in a local
publication.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3825(C)(1).
In many States, including Arizona, sex offenders
must update their registration at least annually—for
life. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3821(J), (M).9 Failing to
comply is a felony. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3824(A).

9 See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 15-20A-3, -10; Cal. Penal Code §§ 290,
290.012; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-22-103, -108; Fla. Stat.
§ 943.0435(11), (14); Ga. Code § 42-1-12(f); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 846E-2; Idaho Code §§ 18-8307, -8310; Mo. Stat. §§ 589.400.4(3),
589.414.7(2)(c); Mont. Code §§ 46-23-504, -506; Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 29-4005(b)(iii), -4001.01(1); N.M. Stat. §§ 29-11A-4(L)(1), -5(D);
42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.15(a)(3), (e), 9799.14(d)(5); Tenn. Stat.
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Further, registered sex offenders “experience a
range of unintended negative consequences that typically have stronger impacts upon sex offenders than
other felons.” Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home:
The Unintended Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions, 42 Harv. C.R.–C.L.L.
Rev. 531, 532 (2007) (collecting studies). As this
Court has recognized, these collateral consequences
include “humiliation” and “public shame.” See Smith,
538 U.S. at 99. They also include “exclusion from
jobs or housing, harassment, and physical harm,” id.
at 109 & n.* (Souter, J., concurring), and “severe
stigma.” Id. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 115–16 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting) (registration “calls to mind shaming punishments once used to mark an offender as someone
to be shunned”).
In sum, while the lengthy sentences for sexual
assault alone create a significant, well-recognized
flight risk, when considered in tandem with the potential for indefinite involuntary commitment and a
lifelong registration requirement, it becomes even
clearer that categorically denying bail for defendants
facing trial for sexual assault is amply justified by
the risk that they will flee rather than face justice.
*

*

*

Measures like Proposition 103 protect victims’
rights, bring offenders to justice, and safeguard
communities. They do not offend due process, because the high risk that a sex offender will reoffend,
§§ 40-39-207(g)(1)(B), -202(31)(B); Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45, 940.225(2);
Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-19-302, -304.
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combined with the devastating harm to victims and
communities and the high risk of flight, justifies the
determination that—certainly where the proof is evident or presumption great—defendants charged with
sexual assault are categorically ineligible for bail. If
permitted to stand, the decision below will deprive
the States of a badly needed tool for keeping sexual
assault victims and communities safe. Because nothing in the Constitution requires—much less permits—that untoward result, the petition should be
granted and the judgment reversed.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should
grant the petition for writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted.
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